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Abstract 
The electricity sector is one of the most important participants in the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). This study provides further evidence on the effect of 
the carbon pricing on the stock returns of electricity companies in the EU-ETS. The 
investigation is undertaken in both phases I and II of the EU-ETS using multivariate 
Generalised AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (M-GARCH) approaches which 
include a multivariate Constant Conditional Correlation Generalised AutoRegressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (CCC-GARCH) and a  Dynamic Conditional Correlation 
Multivariate Generalised AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (DCC-M-GARCH) 
methods. The results show that the carbon market significantly affected the returns of 
electricity companies in Phase 1, but not in phase II of the EU-ETS. The relationship between 
carbon prices and electricity prices was found to be positive and symmetric. However, no 
volatility spillover effect between the carbon market and electricity returns was found in 
Phase I, whereas such effect existed in Phase II and one which was positive. These results 
imply that in the short run, electricity companies are significantly affected by the carbon 
market but this effect diminishes over the long run. These also imply that the risk-return 
relationship does not seem to be in full operation in relation to the link between the carbon 
market and capital markets. 
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GARCH 
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1.  Introduction 
The member states of the European Union (EU), as “regional integration 
organization” parties to the Kyoto Protocol, have collectively committed themselves 
to reducing CO2 emissions by eight percent of the 1990 amount over the period 2008 
to 2012. In 2005, the European Commission (EC) launched an emission trading 
scheme (ETS) based on the ‘cap-and-trade’ principle designed to achieve the Kyoto 
targets. This scheme is the largest international greenhouse gas (GHG) emission 
allowance market so far, which represents 84 % of the global carbon market value 
(World Bank, 2011).  
The electricity sector is one of the most important participants of the EU ETS. Of the 
12,727 installations involved in this scheme, about 65% of them are electricity 
producing plants. As a result, the allowances allocated to this sector have been greater 
than 64% of the overall allocation on the EU Members since 2005. While the overall 
allocation of allowances in the EU has been generous, the electricity sector has been 
in a net short position in the market since the introduction of the ETS except the 
initial year of 2005 (European Commission, 2006). As reported by the World Bank 
(2010),  the power generators have been led to integrate carbon costs into their 
production processes, introducing low-carbon technologies, as well as switching to 
low-carbon energies.  
Given the significance of the power generators’ involvement, and as an essential 
producer of a commodity –  energy, required by the EU economy, the public is 
commonly concerned about whether the power supply could be secured, and whether 
the competiveness of the electricity producers would be diminished by the new 
environmental regulations. The World Bank (2010) points out that issues relating to 
the impacts of the high price volatility of carbon asset and windfall profits gained due 3 
 
to the ‘grandfathering’ allocation approach
2(Weishaar, 2009), still exist. These issues 
have direct implications for the involved electricity generators’ performance in the 
capital market, as well as their investments in low-carbon technologies and energies. 
The research on the European Union Allowance (EUA) market becomes increasingly 
significant with the steady rise in the number of participants. As of 2011, there are 
approximately 356 participants involved in EUA trading including governments, 
regulated companies and private investors, of which around 57 participants are 
financial institutions (BlueNext, 2011;  EEX, 2011;  ICE, 2011;  NASDAQ OMX 
Commodities, 2011). However, the academic literature remains rather thin. Notable 
exceptions are studies of Oberndorfer (2009b), and Veith, Werner, and Zimmermann 
(2009), which investigated the EUA market from a finance perspective. Both studies 
found some evidence of a positive relationship between stock market returns and 
EUA prices. The authors explained their findings by arguing that the conventional 
electricity generating companies benefited from the ETS as they had the ability to 
pass on the price of EUA, which had been allocated for free, to the electricity 
wholesale market.  
The findings of the above studies are somewhat counter-intuitive. On the one hand, 
the expected cash flows might improve due to the pass-through effect of the EUA 
price on the electricity wholesale price. On the other hand, the risk to cash flows is 
also increased due to the increased business risk for the non-compliance to the Kyoto 
reduction commitment by the electricity sector (Busch & Hoffmann, 2007; Kolk & 
Pinkse, 2004), which results in higher expected returns by the investors in electricity 
                                                           
2 The grandfathering allowance approach is defined in Weishaar (2009) as a free allocation approach which is 
based on historical input, output or emission data. This approach is argued to give rise to strategic firm behavior. 
That is, a firm can increase their grandfathered amount by choosing higher production or emission levels before 
the benchmark year. 
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sector. This may lead to a lower stock price level, or even negative stock returns. This 
means, the carbon constraints should have a negative effect on the electricity stock 
performance. This inconsistency between the existing evidence and the theory served 
as an original motivation for this paper. 
In general, this paper examines the effect of the EU-ETS on the stock price of 
electricity companies. The examination is conducted from four perspectives.  Firstly, 
the paper empirically investigates the relationship between the EUA price dynamics 
and electricity stock performance. Secondly, it studies whether the electricity stock 
investors react differently to the EU carbon market during the EUA market shock 
period compared to the pre- and post-shock periods. Thirdly, the study analyses the 
symmetry of investors’ reaction to a rising EUA price and to a falling EUA price. 
Finally, it explores whether there was a volatility spillover effect between the EUA 
market and electricity stocks. These analyses provide new knowledge which is highly 
useful to fund managers and electricity producers in terms of asset allocation and risk 
hedging. Also, the EU-ETS as a multi-national emission trading scheme, the study 
have implications to developing the environmental certificate trading practice 
worldwide.  
The  paper  is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces  the  theory, a review of 
empirical evidence on EU carbon market, and the hypotheses for each of the four 
research objectives. Section 3 outlines the methods and M-GARCH estimation 
techniques proposed for the analyses. In Section 4, a description of data is presented. 
The estimation results are presented and discussed in Section 5. The study concludes 
in Section 6. 
2.  Theory, Empirical Evidence, and Hypotheses 
The EU, to fulfill its emission reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, 
introduced the ETS. Under this scheme, the electricity generators have to incorporate 5 
 
EUA price into their production cost mix. This puts constraints on the way the 
generators conduct their business and reduces their profitability. In effect, the 
additional carbon constraints introduce an additional risk of non-compliance of the 
Kyoto Protocol (Busch & Hoffmann, 2007;  Kolk & Pinkse, 2004). As the 
fundamental business risk is increased, in theory, the investors should require higher 
returns from electricity stocks to compensate for this additional risk. This, in turn, 
impacts negatively on the electricity stock performance. 
In practice, the data show that the stated goal of the EU ETS to achieve emissions 
reduction has been so far successful
3  (World Bank, 2010).  That is, the ETS has 
effectively motivated regulated companies to reduce emissions. Therefore, investors 
should  have  required  more returns from regulated companies because of the 
additionally imposed risk from the Kyoto regulation. As argued by Schwert (1981), 
one of the main purposes of regulations is to distribute wealth from the regulated 
firms to consumers. This means, a new regulation should reduce the profitability of 
the regulated companies in the long-term.  
A company’s risk level in fulfilling its emission reduction commitment is represented 
by its exposure to the risk of the EUA market. As the allowances that were allocated 
to electricity generating companies were free-of-charge, the risk exposure to the EUA 
market may be argued to depend on whether it has a long position or a short position 
in this market. If a company has a long position in the EUA market, the company 
does not bear additional risks from the EU ETS. This is because no matter how the 
EUA price fluctuated, the companies could sell those unused EUAs for additional 
cash. In this case, the company’s profitability is, in fact, enhanced. A positive 
relationship between EUA price return and electricity stock return is expected. 
                                                           
3 The World Bank (2010) shows a 2 to 5 % annual decline during Phase I. The decline is continuing and even 
greater since 2008 when Phase II started. 6 
 
However, if the company is short in the EUAs, then it has to buy EUAs from the 
market. In this case, the company is exposed to the EUA price risk. Thus, a negative 
relationship between EUA price return and electricity stock return is expected.  
The counter-intuitive findings by (Oberndorfer, 2009b; Veith, et al., 2009) of positive 
relationship between EUA prices and electricity stock prices may result from the 
relative short time span of their datasets, and may be linked to temporary over 
allocation of free EUAs by European governments. It is hard to make longer term 
conclusions from the dataset which only extends for three year of the pilot Phase I.  
The downward EUA price shocks that occurred in both phases were caused by the 
news that suggested that regulated companies were in aggregate long position in the 
EUAs. For example, in Phase I, after the first government announcement in  the 
Netherlands and the Czech Republic on 25 April 2006 which disclosed that their 
actual emissions were 7 % and 15 % below the respective allocations, the EUA price 
fell by 10 %. This followed by the announcements of Belgian and French regulators 
about over-allocation of the EUAs, which imposed further downward pressure on the 
EUA prices.  In  Phase II, the GFC has had some negative impact on energy 
production and sales, which subsequently resulted in some unused EUAs. The rush of 
liquidation of EUAs over the period from June 2, 2008 to April 30, 2009 supports this 
argument (World Bank, 2010).  
There are also some studies suggesting that the capital market might asymmetrically 
respond to rising and falling EUA prices. For example, Chen, Sijm, Hobbs, and Lise 
(2008) found electricity generators had the ability to pass the EUA constraint onto 
consumers.  Zachmann and von Hirschhausen  (2008)  found that electricity price 
timely increased in response to rising EUA prices whereas they responded less to 
falling EUA prices. As electricity price development affects electricity generators’ 
cash flows, it should also affect the firm’s value of electricity generators which 7 
 
should be reflected in the stock price. Therefore, it is expected that there will be an 
asymmetric reaction of stock returns to the EUA price development. 
The efficient market hypotheses suggest that stock prices timely reflect news coming 
to the market. When significant news arrives in the EUA carbon market, the EUA 
price tends to be more volatile. As a cost component of the electricity producers 
(Busch & Hoffmann, 2007; Kolk & Pinkse, 2004), the volatility of the EUA price 
should be directly transmitted into the volatility of the producers’ future cash flows. 
As the current stock price is theoretically a function of discounted future cash flows, 
the volatility of the electricity stock should be raised. 
Park and Ratti (2008), Pindyck (2004) and Bernanke (1983) similarly argued that the 
increased volatility in energy price could affect the present value of the discounted 
dividend stream, through increasing uncertainty about product demand or the future 
return on investments. Furthermore, Cuñado and Gracia (2003) and Park and Ratti 
(2008) confirmed this hypothesis by applying oil price volatility to common stocks. 
Therefore, it is also expected that EUA price volatility could affect the present value 
of discounted electricity stock’s cash flows, by increasing the volatility of their 
discounted electricity stock’s cash flows. That is, it is expected that an increased 
volatility in EUA market should subsequently increase the volatility of the electricity 
stocks. 
3.  Methodology 
This study applies an extended Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)  with 
incorporation of the variables constructed to address the impact of EU ETS and a set 
of control variables. The use of the extended CAPM is based on the existing rich 
evidence supporting the market factor explaining energy stocks (Boyer & Filion, 
2007; Oberndorfer, 2009a; Sadorsky, 2001). 8 
 
 
3.1. CCC-GARCH (1,1) Specification Approach
4 
This approach produces results for all the research questions. This approach involves 
a mean equation and a variance equation which are discussed in details in the 
following subsections.  
For the purpose of model specification, we apply Oberndorfer’s (2009b) method to 
incorporate a set of control variables, which covers oil, gas and electricity price 
factors. These risk factors are developed based on the hypothesis by Chen, Roll, and 
Ross (1986) that any variable affecting a stock’s expected future cash flows and/or 
discounted rate should be a risk factor of that stock. For energy stocks, the energy 
commodity price fluctuations which tend to affect the real cash flows of energy-
producing companies were strongly recommended and confirmed by many energy 
stock valuation studies (Boyer & Filion, 2007; R. Faff & Chan, 1998; Regnier, 2007; 
Sadorsky, 2001, 2002; Weron, 2000). Also, the inclusion of gas and electricity price 
factors is important as they matter EUA pricing (Kirat & Ahamada, 2011; Mansanet-
Bataller, Pardo, & Valor, 2007; Zachmann & von Hirschhausen, 2008).  
The mean equation is shown below: 
   relectricity stock,t = α + β1reua,t + β2rmarket,t + β3roil,t + β4rgas,t + β5relectricity,t + γ1ITeua market 
shock + γ2ITeua pre-market shock + γ3ITasymmetric eua + εt              (1) 
In equation (1),  α  is a constant term; relectricity stock,t  is the dependent variable 
representing the electricity stock return in time t. reua,t is the independent variable 
representing  the  EUA price return  in time  t.  rmarket,t,  roil,t,  rgas,t, and relectricity,t  are 
                                                           
4 CCC-GARCH (1,1) has the lowest Schwarz Info Criterion (SIC) values for both Phase I and Phase II datasets 
compared to other lag order combinations from 1 to 4.  9 
 
control variables representing market return, oil price return, gas price return, and 
electricity price return in time t. All price return series are calculated following a 
continuous return formula which is argued to provide a more accurate measure of 
return compared to the discrete formula (Brailsford, Heaney, & Bilson, 2004): rt = 
exp(Pricet / Pricet-1) ×100. εt is the error term which has a Student t-distribution and a 
zero mean., β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, γ1, γ2, and γ3 are parameters that need to be estimated by 
maximum likelihood.  
ITeua market shock and ITeua pre-market shock are the interaction terms constructed to recognize 
the  EUA effect on the  electricity stock return during  market shock period.  This 
follows the methods used in Oberndorfer (2009b), where a dummy (i.e., 1 or 0) is 
utilized. Specifically, the post-shock period is selected as the reference group. ITeua 
market shock, which represents EUA price dynamics during the market shock period, is 
created between EUA price return and a dummy by taking the value of one for the 
EUA price returns during this period and taking zero for the EUA price dynamics 
during periods before and after the market shock. Meanwhile, following the same 
approach, the other interaction term, ITeua pre-market shock, representing EUA price 
returns during the pre-shock period is created. Similarly, it multiplies the EUA price 
returns with a dummy taking one for the shock period and zero for the period 
otherwise. 
According to Ellerman and Buchner (2008), the EUA market shock in Phase I was 
caused by government announcements disclosing that the overall allowance 
allocation were more than the regulated companies’ actual emissions. As a result, the 
EUA price has fallen from about 30 euros in late April 2006 to around 10 euros 
during the first half of May 2006. The starting date of the EUA market shock is 
assumed 26 April 2006, and the ending date is 10 May 2006.  10 
 
In Phase II, the EUA market shock was arguably caused by the GFC effect. As shown 
by World Bank (2010), the EUA market experienced a shock over the period from 
the beginning of June in 2008 to the mid of February in 2009. During this around 9-
month period, the EUA price had a big fall from nearly 29 euros to about 8 euros. 
The period of shock is defined from 2 June 2008 (June 1 is a public holiday and was 
thus excluded) to 12 February 2009.  
Additionally, ITasymmetric eua is another interaction term in equation (1) used to address 
the  EUA asymmetric effect on the  electricity stock return. Similarly, a dummy 
variable is utilized by taking the value of one when EUA price rises, and zero when 
EUA price decreases or does not change. ITasymmetric eua represents the positive EUA 
price return effect which is to investigate whether a rising EUA price will lead to a 
greater electricity stock return than a falling EUA price.  
In equation (1), results on parameters β1, γ1, and γ3 will respectively address the effect 
of the EUA market returns on electricity stock returns, such effect during the EUA 
market shock periods, and the EUA asymmetric effect on electricity stock returns.  
Provided the ability to address time-varying co-variances between variables, a 
multivariate CCC-GARCH method is applied to the variance equation specification 
to address the volatility spillover effect among variables. This approach is introduced 
by  Bollerslev  (1990)  with the assumption that the conditional correlations are 
constant over time.  
The conditional co-variance matrix is produced following the equations below 
(Bauwens, Laurent, & Rombouts, 2006): 






hiit can be defined as any univariate GARCH model, and R = (ρij) is a symmetric 
positive definite matrix with ρii = 1. 
The specific variance equation is produced as below: 
   ht = a + bht-1 + c(εt-1)
2 + d1veua,t + d2voil,t + d3vgas,t + d4velectricity,t              (2) 
a is constant; ht is the conditional variance of the error term, εt, in equation (1) with 
Student-t  distribution and zero mean,  which  represent  electricity  stock volatility 
(velectricity  stock) in time t; veua,t , voil,t, vgas,t, and velectricity,t represent the volatilities of 
EUA, oil, gas  and electricity prices  respectively
5;  b,  c,  d1,  d2,  d3,  d4  and  ht  are 
parameters that are estimated by maximum likelihood. 
In equation (2), results on parameter d1 will address the volatility spillover effect 
between EUA market and the conventional electricity generation sector.  
3.2. DCC-M-GARCH (1,2)
6 
The application of dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) specification is considered 
significant as some studies have already evidenced  that  conditional correlations 
between different financial variables are not constant  (Ewing, Malik, & Ozfidan, 
2002; Fleming, Kirby, & Ostdiek, 1998; Hassan & Malik, 2007; Kodres & Pritsker, 
2002).  
The DCC model of Engle (2002) is defined as follows:  
                                                           
5 The volatilities, which are primarily used in CCC-GARCH process, are the squared returns obtained by the 
formulea: rt = exp(Pricet / Pricet-1) ×100.  
6 DCC-M-GARCH (1,2) has the lowest SIC values for both Phase I and Phase II datasets compared to other lag 







where the N ×N symmetric positive define matrix Qt = (qij,t) is given by: 
Qt = (1 – α - β)average(Q) +αμt-1μ′t-1 +βQt-1 
μt = (μ1tμ2t … μNt)′ 
Average(Q) is the N ×N unconditional variance matrix of μt, and α and β are non-
negative scalar parameters satisfying α +β < 1. 
The  correlation coefficient between any two variables is estimated following the 
expression below: 
 ρij,t = ((1 – α – β)average(qij) +αμi,t-1μj,t-1 + βqij,t-1) / ((1 – α – β)average(qii) + α(μi,t-1)
2 
+ βqii,t-1)
1/2((1 – α – β)average(qjj) +α(μj,t-1)
2 +βqjj,t-1)                  (3) 
ρij,t are the conditional correlations between variables i and j in time t; α and β are 
non-negative scalar parameters satisfying α +β < 1; qij,t and qij,t-1 are conditional co-
variances between variables i and j in time t and t-1 respectively; (μi,t-1)
2 and (μj,t-1)
2 
are unconditional variances of variables i and j in time t-1; μi,t-1μj,t-1 are unconditional 
co-variances between variables i and j in time t-1. 
As it is shown in equation (3), the results on the conditional correlation between 
relectricity stock and reua, which can be represented by ρelectricity stock,eua, will address the 
relationship between EUA market volatility and the volatility  of conventional 
electricity generation sector.  1 
 
4.  Data 
The sample period extends from 21 November 2005 to 30 June 2011 when the data 
for all the variables are available
7. 
Phase I of the ETS was a pilot period organized by the EU, whereas Phase II is the 
official phase for the Kyoto targets. The banking of EUAs was prohibited between 
the phases. That is, the unused EUAs could not be carried forward from phase I to 
Phase II, meaning keeping unused EUAs was useless. Therefore, this cut-off point 
may have some implications for the effect of EUA market on electricity stock 
performance. To address the possible differences in the effects between the two 
phases, analyses are respectively applied to two subsamples: one includes data from 
Phase I, which ranges from 2005 to 2007; the other subsample includes data from 
Phase II, which ranges from 2007 to 2011. 
The analysis follows an aggregated approach where an equally-weighted electricity 
stock portfolio is constructed to represent the financial performance of the EU 
conventional electricity generation sector. The electricity companies are selected 
based on the components of the Dow Jones Euro Stoxx Utilities Index as at 30 June 
2011, which covers the largest utility companies in the Eurozone. For the purpose of 
homogeneity of the sample, only conventional electricity companies are selected for 
the study.  
The EUA spot prices are used in this study. Given the EU ETS has just operated for 
less than 7 years, the trading in the futures market was very thin with large number of 
zero trading days. In contrast, the spot market provides a continuous series of price 
change values necessary for robust econometric testing (BlueNext, 2008).  
                                                           
7 EUA price data is available from 4 August 2005, and stock price data for Électricité De France is available from 
21 November 2005. 2 
 
5.  Empirical Results 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics and Diagnostic Tests 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for each of these return series in Phase I and 
Phase II.  
A graph of the developments of the EUA price return and electricity portfolio return 
in the two phases are generated and presented in Fig. 1. The EUA market shock can 
be observed in the second quarter of 2006, and during the second half of the year 
2008 to the first half of the year 2009. As is evident from the graph, volatility of the 
EUA prices has risen towards the end of Phase I. 
Investors are most concerned about risk associated with the stock returns. Thus it is 
important to get an insight into risk in relation to the electricity stock return. As is 
shown in Fig. 2, the conditional volatility of the electricity portfolio return is dynamic 
and changing throughout the whole sample period. This is why GARCH approaches, 
which are able to address these characteristics, are proposed and applied in this study. 3 
 
Table 1 
















Mean   0.1098   0.0519  -1.2536   0.0588  -0.0722   0.0356 
Median   0.1273   0.1155   0.0000   0.1505  -0.4274   0.5697 
Maximum   3.5656   3.0109   51.0826   5.1580   47.5962   49.3529 
Minimum  -2.6574   -3.4062   -51.0826   -5.3006   -26.2015   -75.0392 
Std. Dev.   0.7633   0.9286   8.7142   1.6451   5.8774   8.9025 
Skewness   0.0747  -0.4437  -0.2258   -0.2285    2.0924  -2.5089 
Kurtosis   4.4562   4.4818   10.0251   3.1581   15.5132   26.2962 
Jarque-Bera   46.87453
***   65.2595
***   1084.0490
***   5.1168
*   3808.283
***   12422.6100
*** 







Observations   525   525   525   525  525   525 
Phase II 4 
 
Mean  -0.0523  -0.0329  -0.0518   0.0184  -0.0097  -0.0150 
Median  -0.0341  0.0000   0.0000   0.0533  -0.1528   0.2746 
Maximum   13.6575   9.9621   10.5479   14.8062   35.7641   37.2534 
Minimum  -8.4962  -8.2498  -10.2852  -10.5271  -11.2918  -61.3401 
Std. Dev.   1.4844   1.7312   2.3751   2.2409   3.6965   5.9915 
Skewness   0.3431   0.1189  -0.2747   0.1550   2.3766  -2.7575 
Kurtosis   14.6893   7.9088   5.4717   6.7838   23.6369   37.1587 
Jarque-Bera   4815.9990
***   848.2738
***   225.1942
***   506.2587
***   15752.6500
***   42052.6800
*** 







Observations   843   843   843   843   843   843 
Jarque-Bera refers to Jarque-Bera test statistic for normality: H0: data are normally distributed, H1: data are not normally distributed; Augmented Dickey Fuller refers to Augmented 
Dickey Fuller unit root test statistic: H0: unit root (non-stationary), H1: no unit root (stationary); t-Statistic values are presented for Jarque-Bera test and Augmented Dickey Fuller 
unit root test; 
*, 
**, 










1/2006 1/2007 1/2008 1/2009 1/2010 1/2011
EUA price change Electricity portfolio return  
Figure 1: Developments of EUA Price Return and Electricity Stock Portfolio Return throughout 
Phase I and Phase II 
Note: The shaded areas represent Phase I period; the remainder areas represent Phase II period.  
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Figure 2: Conditional Variance of Electricity Stock Portfolio Return 
5.2. Estimation Results 
The results for each phase applying CCC-GARCH (1, 1) are presented in Table 2. As shown 
at the bottom of Table 2, the R-squared values, 51.97 % in Phase I and 69.77 % in Phase II of 
the variations in the electricity stock returns are explained by the model. In addition, the 
Durbin-Watson statistics, which are 1.6964 in Phase I and 1.9400 in Phase II, show that there 
is a minor positive autocorrelation effect for each of the dataset as they are close to 2 at which 
no autocorrelation effect exists. Moreover, neither of the constant terms (α) in the mean 2 
 
equation is significant, indicating the models are well specified for both phases. These results 
indicate that the model fits the data well and the electricity portfolio return is sufficiently 
explained by the hypothesized independent variables.  
Table 2 
Results of CCC-GARCH (1,1) Approach. 
 
  Phase I  Phase II 
  Mean Equation 
  EUA variable 
  β1  (eua)  -0.0062
**  0.0029 
  γ1  (eua market shock)  0.0304
***  0.0458 
** 
  γ2  (eua pre-market shock)  -0.0037  0.0442 
  γ3  (asymmetric eua)  0.0061  -0.0361 
  Constant and control variables 
  α  (constant)  0.03880  0.0138 
  β2  (market return)  0.5727
***  0.6673
*** 
  β3  (oil)  0.01419  0.0018 
  β4  (gas)  -0.0014  0.0072 
  β5  (electricity)  0.0037
*  0.0085
** 
  Variance Equation 
  EUA variable 
  d1  (eua volatility)  -0.0000  0.0051
** 
  Constant, GARCH term, ARCH term and control variables 
  α  (constant)  0.2933
***  0.0365
*** 
  b  (GARCH (1) term)  -0.2689
***  0.724119
*** 
  c  (ARCH (1) term)  0.2654
***  0.1499
*** 
  d2  (oil volatility)  -0.0075
***  0.0027 3 
 
  d3  (gas volatility)  0.0002  0.0003 
  d4  (electricity volatility)  -0.0000  -0.0001
*** 
       
  Observations  525  843 
  R-squared  0.5197  0.6977 
  Durbin-Watson stat  1.6964  1.9400 




levels of significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % respectively. 
Results for EUA return effect,  , are different between Phase I and Phase II. In Phase I, the 
EUA price return is found to have a negative impact on the electricity stock return at a 5 % 
level of significance, though the estimated coefficient is small, i.e., -0.0062, indicating a 
relatively small explanatory power. In contrast, the EUA price return is found to have no 
impact on the electricity stock return in Phase II at any conventional level of significance 
(i.e., 1 %, 5 %, or 10 %). 
Results on   show the EUA return effect during the EUA market shock periods. For both 
phases, a significant positive relationship between the EUA price returns and the electricity 
stock returns during market shock periods is found. Moreover, both results are significant but 
at 1 % level in Phase I and 5 % level in Phase II.  
In relation to the potential asymmetric effect of the EUA on electricity stock returns ( 3), no 
evidence was found that the EUA variable has asymmetric effects on electricity stock returns 
in both phases.  
The volatility spillover effect between EUA and electricity stock variables is indicated by the 
results on d1  in  the variance equation. Under the assumption of a constant conditional 
correlation, the volatility of the EUA price is found to have a spillover effect on electricity 
stock at 5 % level in Phase II, whereas there is no evidence of this effect in Phase I. The 
estimated coefficient of the EUA volatility in Phase II (i.e., 0.0051) is positive, indicating a 
slightly positive effect on electricity stock volatility. In Phase I, the coefficient is estimated to 
be 0.0000, which further indicates that the volatility of EUA variable had no impact on the 
electricity stock volatility.  4 
 
The DCC parameters are presented in Table 3. For both phases, p-values for the alpha and 
beta parameters  respectively indicate volatility spillover effect from other markets  and 
persistence of this effect is highly significant. The estimated coefficients for betas, which are 
0.9262 in Phase I and 0.9490 in Phase II, indicate the persistence effects are strong. The 
estimated coefficients for alphas, which is 0.0086 in Phase I and 0.0193 in Phase II, indicate a 
relatively weak volatility spillover effects.  
Table 3 
Results for DCC-M-GARCH Parameters 







The estimated coefficients are presented in this table. 
*, 
**, 
***, indicate levels of significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % 
respectively. 
In Fig. 3, the graphs in terms of the dynamic conditional correlations between electricity 
stock return and EUA price return are shown. Apparently, the conditional correlation series 
present  as  dynamic and time-varying,  which  show the DCC-M-GARCH is considered a 
better approach for explaining volatility spillover effects over the CCC-GARCH. 
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Figure 3. Dynamic Conditional Correlations between Electricity Stock Return and EUA Price 
Return for Phase I and Phase II 1 
 
In Table 4, the results of estimated average conditional correlation coefficient between the 
electricity stock variable and each independent variable are presented. The results for the 
EUA variable, indicate the relationship between the EUA price returns and the electricity 
stock returns. The results are different between the two phases. In Phase I, the average 
conditional correlation for the EUA variable is estimated to be -0.0364, indicating on average 
there was a negative relationship between the EUA price returns and the electricity stock 
returns. In Phase II, the average conditional correlation turns out to be positive, estimated to 
be 0.1657, showing on average there is a positive relationship between the EUA price 
changes and the electricity stock returns in Phase II. 
These results can also be seen in the graphs in Fig.  3. Clearly, the  dynamic  conditional 
correlations generally developed within the range between -0.08 to 0.00  in Phase I, 
suggesting an average negative relationship between the EUA price returns and the electricity 
stock returns. In the graph for Phase II, the conditional correlations are mostly lying within 
the range between 0.00 to around 0.30, which is above 0, showing that this relationship on 
average is likely to be positive.  
Table 4 
Results for Relationships between Electricity Stock Variable and Individual Hypothesized Variables 
  Phase I  Phase II 
     
EUA ( )  -0.0364  0.1657
*** 








Gas  0.0077  0.0714 
Electricity   0.1141
***  -0.0410 
The estimated average conditional correlations are presented in the table. All the values are given to four decimal places. 
*, 
**, 
***, indicate levels of significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % respectively. 
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In addition, although the average relationship is estimated to be negative in Phase I, we can 
find in the graphs in Fig. 3 that, during the market shock (26 April to 10 May 2006), the 
conditional correlations had a large increase beyond zero to around 0.04. In Phase II, shown 
in the second graph of Fig. 3, the conditional correlations during the market shock (2 June 
2008 to 30 April 2009) by GFC developed mostly above the estimated average conditional 
correlation (i.e., 0.1657). In particular, the conditional correlations reached a peak at around 
0.3300 in the months of November and December in 2008. These findings suggest that in 
Phase II there is a much stronger positive relationship between the EUA and the electricity 
stock variables. 
Regarding the spillover effect between the EUA market and electricity stock volatilities, the 
results for Phase I and Phase II are also different. In Phase I, the effect is not significant at 
any conventional level at 10 %. In Phase II, this effect turns out to be highly significant at 1 
% level.   
5.3. Robustness Tests 
To confirm the validity of the outcomes of the modeling, the number of robustness checked 
were performed.  
Firstly, coal price factor was added to the model, i.e., both mean and variance equations. 
Results obtained by additionally incorporating coal price factor are similar to those produced 
from the multivariate GARCH processes.  
Secondly, the market volatility is added into the variance equation. Again, the impact on the 
results is marginal with one notable exception.  Market volatility turns out to be most 
important factor for variance equation in Phase II (i.e., 0.0225
***) and partially replaces the 
effects of EUA variables, some of the other variables on electricity stock in terms of both 
return and volatility.  
Thirdly, we have tested the model on the performance of individual companies included in 
the electricity stock portfolio. The results generally confirm the earlier findings with minor 
variations in terms of significance of control variables.   3 
 
All the analyses do not produce significant results on asymmetric EUA variable, showing the 
investors of electricity stock do not respond differently to a rising EUA price from a falling 
EUA price. Since the results in the robustness tests are similar to the main results, we 
therefore no longer present these in the paper. However, these results are available upon 
request from the authors. 
5.4. Discussion about the EUA Effect 
The negative relationship between EUA price returns and electricity stock returns obtained in 
Phase I confirms the theory but contradicts Oberndorfer (2009b)  and Veith, Werner and 
Zimmermann (2009). Both studies have found that this impact was positive during Phase I. 
For  Veith, et al. (2009),  the inconsistency may be primarily due to the use of different 
econometric techniques. Veith, et al. (2009) based the analysis on an OLS approach. This 
approach is unable to capture volatility clustering and spillover effects in time series data. 
Furthermore, there is no assumption for the spillover effect between variables.  
As for Oberndorfer (2009b), differences in the sample portfolio components may partly 
contribute to  the inconsistent results between Oberndorfer (2009b)  and this study. 
Oberndorfer (2009b) was based on the Dow Jones Euro Stoxx Utilities Index as at 1 August, 
2007 whereas this study is based on the index as at 30 June 2011. The components of the 
Dow Jones Euro Stoxx Utilities Index have changed over time to keep consistent with the 
current market structure, such as new entrants, stock delistings, or changes of subsectors 
(e.g., from conventional generation to alternative generation) (STOXX, 2011). In addition, 
the EUA price data are sourced from a different Exchange. In this study, the EUA prices are 
derived from BlueNext Exchange whereas Oberndorfer (2009b) used data from the European 
Energy Exchange (EEX). BlueNext is considered as the largest EUA spot market. It has a 
high trading volume and is more liquid market. Moreover, with respect to the quality of the 
data, the EUA price data from the EEX remain almost unchanged and extremely low (at 
around 0.02 euro) throughout the year of 2008. The BlueNext, on the other hand, provide a 
consistent series of EUA prices regarding the whole sample period concerned in this study.  
The sample period for Phase I in this study is different from Oberndorfer (2009b). In this 
study, the Phase I period starts from 21 November 2005 to the end of 2007. Oberndorfer 
(2009b) chose the sample starting from 4 August 2005 to 19 June 2007. The author excluded 4 
 
the data from late 2007 by arguing that the EUA prices did not vary too much during that 
time due to the high relative allocation within the scheme. The inclusion of this period 
provides opportunity to gain full picture of Phase I.  
Oberndorfer (2009b) uses GARCH (1,1) approach in his study. The multivariate GARCH 
approaches proposed in this study are considered statistically superior in addressing time-
varying volatilities and spillover effects between market volatilities  than a univariate 
GARCH (1,1) method with multivariate extension. Therefore, the findings should provide a 
more reliable insight on the economic relationships between the electricity sector and the 
EUA market. Finally, this study has a larger sample set than Oberndofer’s (2009b) paper and 
therefore provides more reliable results.  
With respect to the results for Phase II, on the contrary, the relationship between EUA price 
returns and electricity stock returns is found to be insignificant albeit with small positive 
coefficient. We attribute the finding to the impact of GFC on the European markets and 
economies. As it was argued by World Bank (2010), the reduction in energy demand caused 
by the GFC led to energy production and sales to fall as well. The energy production 
companies, consequently, had a decrease in their actual CO2 emissions during this period. 
This resulted in unused EUAs in hands of some electricity companies. Those companies 
could sell these unused EUAs to compensate for their loss in sales revenues. 
Moreover, in electricity generators Europe has somewhat increased their production of 
energy using clean energy sources, therefore reducing their exposure to the EUA market.  As 
it is shown in Fig. 4 below, the actual emissions by the combustion sector had a big fall from 
2008 to 2009. Compared to the preceding years, the actual emissions in 2009 was the lowest. 
Accordingly, investors may see this rush of selling free-charge EUAs was an opportunity for 




Figure 4: Verified Emission of the Combustion Sector of EU-27 from 2005 to 2009 
Note: Source: Community Transaction Log (CITL) (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/) as of March 2009 for the 
reporting years 2005 and 2006, 11 May 2009 for the reporting year 2007 and data as of 17 May 2010 for the reporting year 
2008 and 2009; combustion sector covers the activities related to the generation of electrical power and heat (non-process 
related); verified Emissions is defined as the amount of the total emissions actually emitted by each installation; data are in 
million ton of CO2 equivalent unit. 
For the market shock period in each of the phases, it is found that the EUA price returns had a 
positive impact on electricity stock returns, and this impact is more significant in the market 
shock period than in the periods before and after the market shock. The findings confirm the 
results of Oberndorfer (2009b) for Phase I, who also found a significant positive impact of 
the EUA price returns on electricity stock returns during the market shock caused by the 
government’s disclosure of the over-allocated allowances in Phase I. Similar results are found 
in Phase II, for  the market shock caused by the GFC. As it was discussed before, the 
possibility of trading unused EUAs resulted from the reduced production caused by the GFC 
is high. Investors might consider this was an opportunity for electricity generators to improve 
profitability during the GFC and therefore, see EUA price was  beneficial for electricity 
generators.  
For both phases, there is no evidence supporting investors respond to a rising EUA price 
more than a falling EUA price. This is consistent with Oberndorfer (2009b). Therefore, it 
may be argued that the asymmetric responses of electricity prices to EUA price changes 
found by Zachmann & von Hirschhausen’s (2008)  do not necessarily indicate a 
corresponding asymmetric response  in stock markets.  This finding can be attributed to 
investors may be ignoring the asymmetric effect that has been found in the electricity 
wholesale market in response to the EUA price development.  6 
 
The volatility spillover effect between the EUA market and electricity stocks is found to be 
significant in Phase II  whereas there is no evidence from Phase I. There may be two 
explanations for this finding. First, Phase I was a test phase of a completely new market and 
thus likely to be little-integrated with other markets. As for Phase II, World Bank (2010) is 
convinced that existing evidence from the EU ETS suggests that market became much more 
matured. This means greater informational efficiency of the market when news entering this 
market are timely reflected in the electricity stock price. This also implies that the risk of the 
EUA market has been incorporated into the volatility of future cash flows of conventional 
electricity generators, which implies that this effect will be persistent in the long run.  
The other explanation may be that, during a market crisis, when the market is highly volatile, 
the correlations between markets increase. Previous studies, such as Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002),  Longin  and  Solnik  (2001)  documented this phenomenon for the stocks. More 
recently, Sandoval Junior and Franca (Sandoval Junior & Franca, 2012) found this increased 
correlations among world stock indices for the number of crises which included GFC. The 
findings in this study provide further evidence of augmented link between volatility of stock 
markets and stocks of individual sectors in the market downfalls. These results are also very 
robust at firm level. This finding is important for portfolio managers to select different asset 
classes for their investment portfolios. It  is  also  particularly important to electricity 
generators in terms of hedging unexpected EUA price fluctuations (Benz & Truck, 2006).  
Results from all the approaches indicate that the overall stock market and electricity market 
have a strong and direct implication for electricity stocks. This is consistent with existing 
findings supporting the extremely great explanatory power of the stock market (Boyer & 
Filion, 2007; Carhart, 1997; R. Faff & Chan, 1998; R. W. Faff & Brailsford, 1999; Fama & 
French, 1993; Khoo, 1994; Liu, 2006; Sadorsky, 2001). The importance of the electricity 
wholesale market recognised in relation to electricity stocks is remarkable. In contrast to 
some previous studies, such as Oberndorfer (2009b), Boyer and Filion (2007), Park and Ratti 
(2008), and Sadorsky (2001), oil price returns seem not important for electricity stocks. In 
contrast, the gas market is found to be the least important for electricity stocks in terms of 
both price changes and market volatility. This is especially surprising given that the EU 
electricity generators commonly use gas generation inputs other than oil (EIA, 2007). 
Siliverstovs, L'Hégaret,, Neumann, and von Hirschhausen (2005) provide a reason for this 7 
 
finding that the gas sold in Europe is generally based on long-term contracts with a price that 
is determined by a formula linking gas price to oil price. This is used to prevent incentives for 
fuel switching. Another reason could be that generators often hedge relatively strongly 
against the gas price risk than the oil price risk. 
6.  Conclusion 
This study has investigated the impact of the EU ETS on the electricity generation sector 
from a finance perspective with the use of contemporary M-GARCH methods. Previous 
studies in this area examined Phase I data only and applied a traditional OLS or a univariate 
GARCH approach. In contrast, this study not only revisits Phase I data but also provides 
evidence for Phase II. The more sophisticated CCC-GARCH and DCC-M-GARCH methods 
are utilised for the purpose.  
The relationship between the EUA market return and the electricity stock returns was found 
to be negative in Phase I. No evidence in support of an asymmetric reaction of investors to 
the EUA price rises and falls was found. Whether this impact is positive or negative depends 
on the view of investors on whether electricity generators are able to make a profit by trading 
the free emission allowances in the market rather than whether the allowances are allocated 
for free or not. The view of investors on the profitability of electricity generators in Phase I 
was that it was linked with the compliance effort of the electricity generation sector. 
However, in Phase II, it did not produce evidence of a significant relationship between stock 
performance and carbon price.  These findings may indicate that in the short term, companies 
are heavily impacted by the carbon market but over the long-term, they become less and less 
affected by the carbon market as they are able to adjust their production techniques that 
become less dependent on carbon intensive inputs. This may imply that the electricity 
generators should consider the carbon price fluctuations which affect their finance costs by 
developing appropriate hedging strategies, particularly in the early stages of a company’s 
involvement in the carbon market. 
A positive impact of the EUA price returns on the electricity stock returns was found during 
the period of the EUA market shock in both phases. In addition, this impact was proved to be 
more pronounced compared to the EUA price impact during periods before and after the 
shock. Thus, it seems that economic shocks such as the GFC can even be beneficial to 8 
 
companies in terms of their trading in the carbon market. During economic downturns, as 
companies cut down on their production and therefore their carbon emissions, they may find 
themselves with surplus carbon credits which they can trade profitably.  
A positive effect of the EUA market volatility on the electricity stock price volatility was 
found in Phase II but not in Phase I. This may have been caused by the GFC and correlations 
of volatilities in stock market and carbon market have increased. Since no test for direction of 
causality being performed, stock market may have in fact been a driver in this relationship. 
These findings indicate that there seems to be different forces that impacted returns and risks 
in the carbon market in the period of investigation. It should be noted that these findings and 






Bauwens, L., Laurent, S., & Rombouts, J. V. K. (2006). Multivariate GARCH models: a 
survey. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 21(1), 79-109. 
Benz, E., & Truck, S. (2006). CO2 emission allowances trading in Europe-specifying a new 
class of assets. Problems and Perspectives in Management, 4(3), 30-40. 
Bernanke, B. S. (1983). Irreversibility, uncertainty, and cyclical investment. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 98(1), 85-106. 
BlueNext. (2008). BlueNext Futures EUA welcomes ORBEO as market maker. BlueNext 
Press Release. Retrieved from 
http://www.orbeo.com/IMG/pdf/080508_PR_BlueNext_Futures_EUA_welcomes_ORB
EO_as_market_maker-2.pdf 
BlueNext. (2011). Member List. Membership  Retrieved 10 December, 2011, from 
http://www.bluenext.eu/membership/members.html 
Bollerslev, T. (1990). Modelling the coherence in short-run nominal exchange rates: a 
multivariate generalised ARCH model. The Review of Economics and Statistics 72(3), 
498-505. 
Boyer, M. M., & Filion, D. (2007). Common and fundamental factors in stock returns of 
Canadian oil and gas companies. Energy Economics, 29(3), 428-453. 
Brailsford, T., Heaney, R., & Bilson, C. (2004). Investments: Concepts and Applications 
South Melbourne: Thomson. 
Busch, T., & Hoffmann, V. H. (2007). Emerging carbon constraints for corporate risk 
management. Ecological Economics, 62(3-4), 518-528. 
Carhart, M. M. (1997). On persistence in mutual fund performance. The Journal of Finance, 
52(1), 57-82. 
Chen, N.-F., Roll, R., & Ross, S. A. (1986). Economic forces and the stock market. Journal 
of Business, 59(3), 383-403. 
Chen, Y., Sijm, J., Hobbs, B. F., & Lise, W. (2008). Implications of CO2 emissions trading 
for short-run electricity market outcomes in Northwest Europe. Journal of Regulatory 
Economics, 34(3), 251-281. 
Cuñado, J., & Pérez de Gracia, F. (2003). Do oil price shocks matter? evidence for some 
European countries. Energy Economics, 25(2), 137-154. 10 
 
EEX. (2011). Participants.   Retrieved 10 December, 2011, from 
http://www.eex.com/en/EEX/Participants 
EIA. (2007).  International Energy Outlook 2007. Washington DC: Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting. 
Ellerman, A. D., & Buchner, B. K. (2008). Over-allocation or abatement? a preliminary 
analysis of the EU ETS based on the 2005-06 emissions data. Enironmental & Resource 
Economics, 41(2), 267-287. 
Engle, R. (2002). Dynamic conditional correlation: a simple class of multivariate generalized 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models. Journal of Business & Economic 
Statistics, 20(3), 339-350. 
European Commission. (2006). Community transaction log. Retrieved 15 August 2011, from 
European Commission Climate Action: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/ 
Ewing, B. T., Malik, F., & Ozfidan, O. (2002). Volatility transmission in the oil and natural 
gas markets. Energy Economics, 24(6), 525-538. 
Faff, R., & Chan, H. (1998). A multifactor model of gold industry stock returns: evidence 
from the Australian equity market. Applied Financial Economics, 8(1), 21-28. 
Faff, R. W., & Brailsford, T. J. (1999). Oil price risk and the Australian stock market. 
Journal of Energy Finance and Development 4(1), 69-87. 
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1993). Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 33(1), 3-56. 
Fleming, J., Kirby, C., & Ostdiek, B. (1998). Information and volatility linkages in the stock, 
bond, and money markets. Journal of Financial Economics, 49(1), 111-137. 
Forbes, K. J., & Rigobon, R. (2002). No contagion, only interdependence: measuring stock 
market comovements. The Journal of Finance, 57(5), 2223-2261. 
Hassan, S. A., & Malik, F. (2007). Multivariate GARCH modeling of sector volatility 
transmission. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 47(3), 470-480. 
ICE. (2011). Member List. ICE Futures Europe  Retrieved 10 December, 2011, from 
https://www.theice.com/FuturesEuropeMembers.shtml#A 
Khoo, A. (1994). Estimation of foreign exchange exposure: an application to mining 
companies in Australia. Journal of International Money and Finance, 13(3), 342-363. 
Kirat, D., & Ahamada, I. (2011). The impact of the European Union emission trading scheme 
on the electricity-generation sector. Energy Economics, 33(5), 995-1003. 11 
 
Kodres, L. E., & Pritsker, M. (2002). A rational expectations model of financial contagion. 
The Journal of Finance, 57(2), 769-799. 
Kolk, A., & Pinkse, J. (2004). Market strategies for climate change. European Management 
Journal, 22(3), 304-314. 
Liu, W. (2006). A liquidity-augmented capital asset pricing model. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 82(3), 631-671. 
Longin, F., & Solnik, B. (2001). Extreme correlation of international equity markets. The 
Journal of Finance, 56(2), 649-676. 
Mansanet-Bataller, M., Pardo, A., & Valor, E. (2007). CO2  prices, energy and weather. 
Energy Journal, 28(3), 73-92. 
NASDAQ OMX Commodities. (2011). Member List.   Retrieved 10 December, 2011, from 
http://www.nasdaqomxcommodities.com/membership/memberlist/ 
Oberndorfer, U. (2009a). Energy prices, volatility, and the stock market: evidence from the 
Eurozone. Energy Policy, 37(12), 5787-5795. 
Oberndorfer, U. (2009b). EU emission allowances and the stock market: evidence from the 
electricity industry. Ecological Economics, 68(4), 1116-1126. 
Park, J., & Ratti, R. A. (2008). Oil price shocks and stock markets in the U.S. and 13 
European countries. Energy Economics, 30(5), 2587-2608. 
Pindyck, R. S. (2004). Volatility and commodity price dynamics. Journal of Futures Markets, 
24(11), 1029-1047. 
Regnier, E. (2007). Oil and energy price volatility. Energy Economics, 29(3), 405-427. 
Sadorsky, P. (2001). Risk factors in stock returns of Canadian oil and gas companies. Energy 
Economics, 23(1), 17-28. 
Sadorsky, P. (2002). Time-varying risk premiums in petroleum futures prices. Energy 
Economics, 24(6), 539-556. 
Sandoval Junior, L., & Franca, I. D. P. (2012). Correlation of financial markets in times of 
crisis. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 391(1-2), 187-208. 
Schwert, G. W. (1981). Using financial data to measure effects of regulation. Journal of Law 
and Economics, 24(1), 121-158. 12 
 
Siliverstovs, B., L'Hégaret, G., Neumann, A., & von Hirschhausen, C. (2005). International 
market integration for natural gas? a cointegration analysis of prices in Europe, North 
America and Japan. Energy Economics, 27(4), 603-615. 
STOXX. (2011, 31 March). Euro STOXX@ Supersector Indices. Factsheet  Retrieved July, 
2011, from www.stoxx.com 
Veith, S., Werner, J. R., & Zimmermann, J. (2009). Capital market response to emission 
rights returns: evidence from the European power sector. Energy Economics, 31(4), 
605-613. 
Weishaar, S. (2009). Towards Auctioning: the Transformation of the European Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions Trading System : Present and Future Challenges to Competition Law 
(Vol. 2). Alphen aan den Rijn, the Netherlands: Kluwer Law International. 
Weron, R. (2000). Energy price risk management. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its 
Applications, 285(1-2), 127-134. 
World Bank. (2010). State and trends of the carbon market 2010. Retrieved from 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCARBONFINANCE/Resources/State_and_Tren
ds_of_the_Carbon_Market_2010_low_res.pdf. 
World Bank. (2011).  State and trends of the carbon market 2011.  Retrieved from 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCARBONFINANCE/Resources/State_and_Tren
ds_Updated_June_2011.pdf. 
Zachmann, G., & von Hirschhausen, C. (2008). First evidence of asymmetric cost pass-
through of EU emissions allowances: examining wholesale electricity prices in 
Germany. Economics Letters, 99(3), 465-469. 
 
 
 